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The generosity of the Unemployment Insurance system (UI) plays a central role for the job 
search behavior of unemployed individuals. Standard search theory predicts that an increase 
in UI benefit generosity, either in terms of benefit duration or entitlement, has a negative 
impact on the job search activities of the unemployed increasing their unemployment 
duration. Despite the disincentive effect of UI on unemployment duration, UI benefit 
generosity may also increase job match quality by allowing individuals to wait for better job 
offers. In this paper we use a sharp discontinuity in the maximum duration of unemployment 
benefits in Germany, which increases from 12 months to 18 months at the age of 45, to 
identify the effect of extended benefit duration on unemployment duration and post-
unemployment outcomes. We find a spike in the re-employment hazard for the unemployed 
workers with 12 months benefit duration, which occurs around benefit exhaustion. This leads 
to lower unemployment duration compared to their counterparts with 18 months benefit 
duration. However, we also show that those unemployed who obtain jobs close to and after 
the time when benefits are exhausted are significantly more likely to exit subsequent 
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The generosity of the Unemployment Insurance system (UI) plays a central role for the
job search behavior of unemployed individuals(Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 1992; Gruber,
1997). A standard result in the literature is that UI creates re-employment disincentives.
An increase in UI beneﬁt generosity has a negative impact on the job search activities
of the unemployed increasing their unemployment duration. Moreover, the exit rate from
unemployment increases closer to beneﬁt expiration since the marginal beneﬁt of search
increases and the reservation wage falls (Mortensen, 1977, Van den Berg, 1990). Many
empirical studies have investigated the eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on the exit rate
from unemployment (e.g. Meyer, 1990; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Card and Levine, 2000,
for the US, Roed and Zhang, 2003; Lalive, Van Ours, Zweim¨ uller, 2006; Van Ours and
Vodopivec, 2006; Card, Chetty and Weber, 2007a and 2007b for Europe). A common
ﬁnding is that limiting unemployment beneﬁt duration tends to introduce a spike in the
exit rate around beneﬁt exhaustion.
The focus of most of the literature on how beneﬁt duration aﬀects the exit rate from un-
employment does not consider the potential eﬀect of UI on post-unemployment outcomes
or job match quality. The observed spike close to beneﬁt expiration might reduce the
quality of job matches as workers might become less selective.1 The non-stationarity that
arises because of limited beneﬁt duration implies that individuals with diﬀerent lengths
of beneﬁt entitlement should have diﬀerent optimal paths of reservation wage and search
eﬀort over time. This diﬀerence in the optimal job search behavior could lead to diﬀerent
realized distributions of job quality. Individuals with a given length of unemployment, the
same level of beneﬁts, but a longer period of remaining beneﬁt entitlement may wait for
job oﬀers which are better either in terms of re-employment wages and/or employment
stability.
In this paper we investigate the eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on the re-employment
probabilities and on post-unemployment outcomes such as employment stability and re-
employment wages. In particular, we are focusing on the job search behavior around ben-
eﬁt expiration to understand the extent to which jobs accepted closer to the time beneﬁts
elapse might be of worse quality (less stable, lower wage) because workers become less se-
lective. That is, we analyze the eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on post-unemployment
outcomes not only for the average unemployed but also for diﬀerent groups of unemployed,
which are deﬁned by their unemployment duration. Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on
a sharp discontinuity in the maximum duration of unemployment beneﬁts in Germany,
which increases from 12 to 18 months at the age of 45. Comparing unemployed who are
just below the age threshold with individuals just above the corresponding age gives us a
measure of the eﬀect of extended beneﬁts. We use an inﬂow sample into unemployment
for the years 2001 to 2003, which is based on administrative records with information on
labor market states of each individual being observed for 3 years. Given the large samples
1Card and Levine (2000) suggest that the spike might be related to the fact that workers become less
selective as they approach the beneﬁt expiration. An alternative explanation of the spike is based on the
strategic timing of job starting dates. Boone and Van Ours (2009) provide supporting evidence on this
based on Slovenian data.available and the age of the discontinuity we also consider men and women separately.
Our analysis based on a regression discontinuity design (RD) may suﬀer from two
potential selection issues that might invalidate our identiﬁcation strategy. First, ﬁrms and
workers might delay the timing of the job separation for the worker to beneﬁt from a longer
entitlement period, leading to non-random selection around the eligibility threshold. We
test the frequency of the inﬂow into unemployment and the observable characteristics of
the unemployed around the discontinuity and we ﬁnd no evidence of selection. Second,
although the assignment into treatment at the beginning of the unemployment spell is
based on this sharp discontinuity, there might be selection in the resulting sample of the re-
employed based on observed and unobserved characteristics (Ham and LaLonde, 1996). We
investigate the sensitivity of our results to the presence of dynamic selection by estimating
a bivariate discrete-time hazard model with correlated unobserved heterogeneity and we
ﬁnd that our ﬁndings are robust to this form of selection. Hence, our results are not driven
by selection into treatment or dynamic selection and can be interpreted as causal eﬀects.
We ﬁnd evidence of an eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on unemployment duration
but also on the duration and wages of accepted jobs. In particular, we ﬁnd a spike in
the unemployment hazard for the unemployed workers with 12 months beneﬁt duration,
which occurs close to beneﬁt exhaustion. The unemployed who are above the age of 45
and receive additional six months of beneﬁts exhibit a signiﬁcantly lower exit rate at the
beneﬁt expiration time of the younger group at month 12. The ﬁnding of a spike at beneﬁt
exhaustion is consistent with the existing empirical evidence. In terms of the eﬀect on post-
unemployment outcomes, we ﬁnd that unemployed workers with 18 months of beneﬁts ﬁnd
jobs that last longer compared to the those workers who receive beneﬁts for 12 months.
In particular, we observe that the unemployed with shorter beneﬁt duration who ﬁnd jobs
close to the time beneﬁts are exhausted and when they do not receive beneﬁts anymore are
signiﬁcantly more likely to exit subsequent employment compared to their counterparts
with extended beneﬁt duration. This suggests that close to the beneﬁt expiration and
after that period the unemployed with 12 months beneﬁt duration accept jobs they would
otherwise reject, while those who receive additional 6 months of insurance tend to accept
jobs that are of better quality and last longer. Finally, looking at re-employment wages
we ﬁnd that those who accept a job around the time their beneﬁts expire or when do not
receive beneﬁts anymore have signiﬁcantly lower wages compared to their counterparts
who accept a job while they could still search and being insured.
Our ﬁndings extend previous studies, which have looked at the eﬀect of beneﬁt duration
on post-unemployment outcomes but have focused on the average eﬀect. For example,
Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007a) for Austria and Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) for
Slovenia evaluate an extension of potential duration of UI beneﬁts and ﬁnd that it lowers
job-ﬁnding rates but has no eﬀect on subsequent job match quality. The ﬁndings in this
paper suggest that due to the non-stationarity of job search there exist eﬀects of extended
beneﬁt duration on job match quality, which are heterogeneous.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework and
the existing empirical evidence. Section 3 describes the institutional background. Section 4
discusses the identiﬁcation strategy, describes the data, and provides a descriptive analysis.
2The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Evidence
The main objective of government-provided UI is to allow for consumption smoothing
in the event of a negative shock that leads to unemployment. A major concern with UI
is the disincentive eﬀect due to moral hazard that might aﬀect the worker’s willingness
to search for jobs. There is, therefore, a trade-oﬀ between providing insurance and the
incentives to search for work. Standard search theory predicts that an increase in UI
beneﬁt generosity, either in terms of beneﬁt duration or entitlement, has a negative impact
on the job search activities of the unemployed increasing their unemployment duration.
Unemployed workers exert lower search eﬀort as the opportunity cost of search is lower and
they choose higher reservation wages. Moreover, closer to the time of beneﬁt exhaustion,
the value of unemployment drops since the marginal beneﬁt of search increases and the
reservation wage falls, leading to a higher exit rate out of unemployment (Mortensen,
1977).
This non-stationarity implies that individuals with diﬀerent lengths of beneﬁt entitle-
ment should have diﬀerent optimal paths of reservation wage and search eﬀort over time
(van den Berg 1990). Figure 1 shows a stylized illustration of the eﬀects of an extended
beneﬁt duration on the unemployment hazard rate. There are two periods of interest. The
ﬁrst is the time until beneﬁts are exhausted for the ﬁrst group of unemployed denoted as
T1. For t ≤ T1 the job ﬁnding rate θ is equal for both groups at the beginning of the
spell. Due to the time-limited beneﬁt duration, closer to the time of beneﬁt expiration the
exit rate of those with shorter beneﬁt duration is increasing compared to their counter-
parts with a longer beneﬁt entitlement, and stays constant at a higher level than before
exhaustion. The second period is deﬁned by the exhaustion points of the two groups. For
T1 < t < T2, the hazard rate of the ﬁrst group is likely to be higher because beneﬁts have
been exhausted, while the second group of workers receives beneﬁts until T2.2
Insert Figure 1 about here
Besides the trade-oﬀ between insurance and the incentives to leave unemployment for
a job, the relationship between the length of beneﬁt entitlement and the optimal path of
job search behavior might lead to a positive relationship between insurance and the quality
of jobs obtained. The reason is that closer to beneﬁt expiration and after beneﬁts have
expired workers might become less selective and obtain jobs of lower quality. Therefore,
the diﬀerence in the optimal job search behavior of individuals with diﬀerent lengths of
beneﬁt entitlement over time could lead to diﬀerent realized distributions of job quality.
Individuals with a given length of unemployment, the same level of beneﬁts, but a longer
period of remaining beneﬁt entitlement may wait for job oﬀers which are better in terms
of re-employment wages and employment stability. The job match quality aspect of UI
has been considered in a number of theoretical papers. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show
2In our empirical analysis T1 = 12, while T2 = 18.
3that the increased utility of unemployment when receiving UI induces workers to search
for higher wages and ﬁrms respond by creating high-wage, high-quality jobs. Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999) show that UI can increase job match quality by helping workers to get
jobs which are compatible with their skills and therefore less likely to dissolve.
Numerous studies have investigated the eﬀect of beneﬁt duration and its eﬀect on the
exit rate from unemployment both in the U.S. and in Europe. Exploiting diﬀerences in
potential beneﬁt duration across U.S. states, Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990)
ﬁnd a sharp increase in the exit rate from unemployment before beneﬁts are exhausted,
while such increases are not found for the non-recipients. Card and Levine (2000) exploit
an exogenous variation in beneﬁt duration in New Jersey and also ﬁnd a spike in the
unemployment hazard rate around beneﬁt expiration. In a more recent study Addison
and Portugal (2008) also ﬁnd for the U.S. an increase in the exit rate from unemployment
before beneﬁts are exhausted. Ham and Rea (1987) obtain similar ﬁndings for Canada.
For Europe, an early study is Hunt (1995) for Germany who makes use of institutional
changes in the beneﬁt entitlement schemes in the 1980s. The changes mainly consisted in
an extension of the maximum duration of unemployment beneﬁt receipt for unemployed
older than 42 years, whereby diﬀerent age groups are aﬀected diﬀerently. She applies
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimators using the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) and
ﬁnds a negative impact of increased beneﬁt entitlement on the hazard rate from unem-
ployment to employment as well as out of labor force. The evidence of follow-up studies on
the eﬀects of institutional changes in Germany in the 1980s is rather mixed.3 In a recent
study Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) make use of an administrative data set in order to
analyze the eﬀects of the reforms in the 1980s on the distribution of duration in nonem-
ployment. Their ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms and older workers make use of the extended
beneﬁt entitlement periods as part of early retirement schemes, but they do not ﬁnd any
impact on the time spent in unemployment before ﬁnding a new job.
Carling, Edin, Harkman, and Holmlund (1996) ﬁnd for Sweden an increase in the exit
rate from unemployment around beneﬁt exhaustion. Due to the availability of labor market
programs at the end-of-beneﬁt-period, they ﬁnd a much larger increase in the exit rate
to those programs. Winter-Ebmer (1998) and Lalive and Zweim¨ uller (2004) investigate
the eﬀect of an extended beneﬁt period in Austria and ﬁnd signiﬁcant disincentive eﬀects.
Winter-Ebmer (1998) ﬁnds an eﬀect which exists only for males and is larger for long
unemployed spells. Roed and Zhang (2003) for Norway ﬁnd instead that the spike around
the time of beneﬁt expiration is larger for females than for males. Van Ours and Vodopivec
(2006) studying beneﬁt reduction in Slovenia ﬁnd both strong eﬀects on the exit rate out
of unemployment and substantial spikes around beneﬁt exhaustion. More recent evidence
based on an RD design is oﬀered by Lalive (2008) using discontinuities in the potential
beneﬁt duration at age 50 and across regions in Austria. He ﬁnds that extended beneﬁt
duration increases unemployment duration and the eﬀect is larger for women compared
to men.
3An example of a study based on the SOEP and ﬁnding no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the reforms on the
duration of unemployment is Schneider and Hujer (1997) whereas Steiner (2001) ﬁnds a negative correlation
of receiving unemployment beneﬁts and the probability of leaving unemployment. For a detailed discussion
of the literature on Germany see e.g. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010).
4The empirical evidence for the eﬀect of UI on post-unemployment outcomes is more
scarce and mixed. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) were the ﬁrst to consider the eﬀect of UI
on post-unemployment outcomes ﬁnding a positive eﬀect of beneﬁts on post-unemployment
wages. Addison and Blackburn (2000) review the literature and provide results which
suggest a weak eﬀect of UI on re-employment wages. More recently, Centeno and Novo
(2009) exploit a reform of the Portuguese UI system that increased the entitlement period
for some age-groups, while leaving it unchanged for other age-groups. They also ﬁnd that
the extension had a small but positive eﬀect on re-employment wages, which is stronger
at the bottom of the pre-unemployment wage distribution and is concentrated at short
unemployment durations.
Because wages are not the only state variable suﬃcient to summarize individual well-
being, another strand of the literature measures the eﬀect of UI generosity on post-
unemployment outcomes with the incidence of unemployment, or the time elapsed between
re-employment and acceptance of a subsequent job, using job matching arguments based
on Jovanovic (1979). In a series of papers, Belzil (1992, 1995, 2001) analyzes unemployment
experience and employment duration in the context of the Canadian UI reform ﬁnding
that the incidence of voluntary unemployment is positively correlated with the duration
of the preceding spell of unemployment and beneﬁt exhaustion, and a weak positive rela-
tionship between re-employment duration and unemployment beneﬁt generosity. Centeno
(2004) studies the eﬀect of the generosity of U.S. beneﬁt levels and ﬁnds that larger UI
beneﬁts lead to longer subsequent employment spells. Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007b)
apply a regression discontinuity design and ﬁnd for Austria that an increase in beneﬁt
entitlement length reduces job-ﬁnding rates but does not have any eﬀect on subsequent
job match quality, measured in wage growth and job duration. Van Ours and Vodopivec
(2008) investigate the eﬀect of reducing the potential duration of unemployment beneﬁts
in Slovenia and ﬁnd that it strongly increased job ﬁnding rates but had no eﬀect on the
quality of post-unemployment jobs. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) also do not ﬁnd evi-
dence for an improved job match quality in terms of job stability or wages for the older
worker after the reform in Germany in the 80s. Tatsiramos (2009) using individual data
from the European Community Household Panel for eight countries, ﬁnds that although
receiving beneﬁts has an adverse eﬀect by increasing unemployment duration, there is
also a positive eﬀect associated with the increased duration of subsequent employment.
His ﬁndings suggest that jobs which are accepted while being insured last longer. This
beneﬁcial eﬀect of unemployment insurance on employment stability is pronounced in
countries with relatively generous beneﬁt systems.
3 Institutional Background
Germany has undergone some major labor market reforms in the last couple of years
including the Hartz reforms which consisted of, among other things, a change of the
unemployment beneﬁt and social assistance schemes.4 In our empirical analysis we are
4A detailed description of the unemployment insurance system in Germany and its changes over time
is given in Konle-Seidl, Eichhorst, and Grienberger-Zingerle (2009).
5focussing on an inﬂow sample of unemployed workers between 2001 and 2003, a period
prior to the Hartz reforms.
Prior to the reforms, Germany had a system of income protection which was based
on three pillars: 1) unemployment beneﬁts, 2) unemployment assistance and 3) social
assistance. Unemployment beneﬁts (UB, Arbeitslosengeld) provide earnings-related income
replacement and are based on an employment record in a reference period (see §127,
Social Code III, Sozialgesetzbuch III). The replacement rate of UB depends on family
status, while the duration depends on age and previous employment duration. Unemployed
persons with at least one child are entitled to 67% of previous net remuneration and 60%
otherwise; individual means or needs are not taken into account. The exact amount is
calculated based on the average gross daily income within the assessment frame of twelve
months from which social security contributions, income tax and the solidarity surcharge
were subtracted to get the average net daily income which is the basis for the UB claim.
Insert Table 1 about here
To generate a claim for UB workers had to be employed for at least 12 months in the last
three years (Rahmenfrist) before entering unemployment; workers who have been employed
less than 12 months within the last three years were not entitled for UB, but could receive
means-tested social assistance. The maximum duration of unemployment beneﬁts varied
between 6 and 32 months (see Table 1). Depending on age and months worked in the last
seven years, there exist several discontinuities in the maximum duration of unemployment
beneﬁts. For the purpose of our analysis we are focusing on the discontinuity at the age of
45 for which the maximum beneﬁt duration increases by 6 months - from 12 to 18 months,
given the workers have been employed for at least 36 months in the last seven years. Other
discontinuities also appear at age 47 and 52 which lead to an increase of the maximum
beneﬁt duration by four months, conditional on previous employment duration of 44 and
52 months, respectively. We concentrate on the discontinuity at the age of 45 because the
additional jumps from 18 to 22 and 22 to 26 occur at a very late stage in the unemployment
spell and it seems reasonable to expect that the transition rate from unemployment to
employment is quite low at this stage independent of receiving unemployment beneﬁts or
unemployment assistance. Finally, there is another discontinuity at age 57 of six months
increase of beneﬁt duration from 26 to 32 months. We do not consider this discontinuity
either because it is very much related to early retirement. See Tatsiramos (2010) for an
analysis of unemployment an early retirement for older workers. The beneﬁts are funded
through employer and employee contributions and administered by the Public Employment
Services (PES).5
After the entitlement period of UB had expired unemployed individuals were eligible
for principally unlimited and means-tested unemployment assistance (UA, Arbeitslosen-
hilfe). These beneﬁts were still earnings-related (57%/53% replacement rate with/without
children). In contrast to UB, the UA was granted for an unlimited period (as long as
individuals were available for the labor market) and funded through the Federal budget,
5The discontinuities were changed within the Hartz reforms, but since these changes became eﬀective
only on February 1, 2006 they are not relevant for our analysis.
6i.e., by general taxation. Finally, the social assistance (SA, Sozialhilfe), provided basic
income protection on a means-tested and ﬂat-rate basis for all German inhabitants. This
assistance was independent of employment experience but conditional on not having other
resources from earned income, other social beneﬁts or family transfers. This makes clear
that the beneﬁts for unemployed individuals do not drop down to zero once the maximum
duration for unemployment beneﬁts is reached.
A worker who enters unemployment and is eligible for unemployment beneﬁts keeps
the entitlement for up to four years. The entitlement expires either after this time period
or if a new entitlement emerges. To generate a new entitlement it is necessary to be
employed for at least 12 months. In case that the worker still had months left from an
old UB entitlement, the new entitlement is added to the old one up to the maximum
possible entitlement according to age. Consider the following example. Assume a 44.5
years old individual who enters unemployment and who can claim - based on previous
employment record - the maximum beneﬁt duration of 12 months. Let us distinguish two
cases. In the ﬁrst case, the individual exits unemployment for a job after eight months
and stays employed for less than 12 months before becoming unemployed again. In this
second unemployment spell the remaining entitlement period will be four months and not
18 months. This will be the case, even if the individual has crossed the age threshold of
45, because the entitlement is not renewed, as the employment duration between the two
unemployment spells was less than 12 months. In the second case, the individual exits
unemployment for a job after eight months but stays employed for at least 12 months
before becoming unemployed again. In this case, the individual who will be older than 45
will be entitled to the longer beneﬁt duration of 18 months.
4 Identiﬁcation and Data
4.1 Regression Discontinuity Approach
The goal of our empirical analysis is to examine the eﬀects of extended beneﬁt duration
on unemployment duration and post unemployment outcomes. We have outlined in the
previous Section that German legislation for unemployment beneﬁts contains sharp dis-
continuities with respect to age which we will exploit as a source for identiﬁcation. With a
regression discontinuity approach we will be able to measure the eﬀects of the treatment
at some threshold. Following Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) let Di ∈ {0,1} be
a binary treatment variable indicating whether individuals are below (Di = 0) or above
(Di = 1) the threshold. Y 0
i ,Y 1
i are the individual potential outcomes and Y 1
i − Y 0
i is the
individual treatment eﬀect. In the sharp regression discontinuity design, the assignment
Di is a deterministic function of one of the covariates Zi such that:
Di = 1{Zi ≥ c} (1)
The forcing variable Zi in our case is age and the threshold c we are interested in corre-
sponds to 45 years. This implies that all individuals change participation status exactly at
c. Institutionally this is the case, since the age at entry into unemployment is determining
7the maximum beneﬁt duration. But still people might wait out with their unemployment
registration until reaching the age threshold. However, this is unlikely since unemploy-
ment needs to be announced already in advance (in order to avoid sanctions) such that a
postponement carries a high risk. We will test whether there is evidence for such strategic
behavior. The average causal eﬀect δ of the treatment at the discontinuity point is then
given by:
δ = E[Y 1
i − Y 0




i | Zi = z] − lim
z↑c
E[Y 0
i | Zi = z] (2)
= E[Yi(D = 1) − Yi(D = 0)|Zi = c]
The treatment eﬀect is identiﬁed if the conditional mean of Y 0 is continuous at c (i.e.,
E[Y d|Z = z] is continuous in z at c for d = {0,1}). Under this assumption, the treatment
eﬀect δ is obtained by estimating the discontinuity in the empirical regression function.
We are interested in three outcome variables: the unemployment duration, the stability or
duration of the subsequent employment spell and reemployment wages.
Many of our observations are right-censored, i.e. we do not observe the end of the
unemployment spell before the end of our observation window. In order to take this into
account, we estimate a hazard rate model for the transition rate from unemployment
to employment. Unemployment in our case includes “out of labor force” because we are
interested in the eﬀect on the time until the next job and not on the time being oﬃcially
registered as unemployed. The corresponding hazard rate λue at time t can be written as:
λue(t) = λu0(t)exp(αu1Xi + µuDi + βu0Di(Agei − Age0) + βu1(1 − Di)(Agei − Age0)). (3)
where λu0(t) describes the time varying baseline hazard rate and µu captures the causal
eﬀect of the increase in the maximum beneﬁt duration on the hazard rate from unemploy-
ment to employment. The parameters βu0 and βu1 capture the eﬀects of the assignment
variable age below and above the threshold on the probability of leaving unemployment
for a job. This ensures that µu does not capture a general age eﬀect but the causal im-
pact of the discontinuity in the beneﬁt duration, see Lalive (2008) for a similar approach
in the context of linear regression models. In addition to that we control for observable
characteristics Xi.
Besides the transition process from unemployment to employment a main focus of our
study is on the eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on the stability of new jobs. There-
fore, we additionally estimate the hazard rate model for transition from employment to
unemployment, which is given by:
λeu(t) = λe0(t)exp(αe1Xei + µeDi + βe0Di(Agei − Age0) + βe1(1 − Di)(Agei − Age0)). (4)
The causal eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on subsequent job stability is given by µe,
λe0(t) describes the time varying baseline hazard rate and αe1 captures the impact of ob-
servable characteristics Xei on the transition process from employment to unemployment.
Xei includes the previous unemployment duration.
8Although the assignment into treatment at the beginning of the unemployment is
based on a sharp discontinuity and is therewith assumed to be exogenous, there might
be dynamic selection in the resulting sample of the re-employed based on observed and
unobserved characteristics. For a similar argument in the context of experimental data on
training see Ham and LaLonde (1996). In order to test whether dynamic selection based
on unobservable characteristics drives our results we will additionally estimate bivariate
hazard rate models with potentially correlated unobservables inﬂuencing both the duration
of unemployment and the duration of subsequent employment.6
For the estimation of the eﬀect of extended beneﬁts on wages we estimate the following
linear regression:
log(wi) = αwXei + µwDi + βw0Di(Agei − Age0) + βw1(1 − Di)(Agei − Age0) (5)
The eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on reemployment wages is given by µw, while αw
captures the impact of observable characteristics including the previous unemployment
duration on the logarithm of wages.
As we have outlined in Section 2 and Figure 1, we expect a higher exit rate out
of unemployment closer to the time of beneﬁt exhaustion. Corresponding to that, we
expect the treatment eﬀect to vary over time spent in unemployment. For that reason we
estimate for the hazard rate from unemployment to employment a speciﬁcation in which we
interact the baseline hazard rate with the treatment dummy. Since we expect that workers
might become less selective the closer they are to beneﬁt expiration and after their beneﬁt
entitlement has expired, we additionally interact the impact of being eligible for 18 months
of beneﬁts with the time interval in which individuals left the unemployment spell for a
job. These interaction eﬀects will provide insights in the heterogeneity of the treatment
eﬀects with respect to two dimensions of job match quality, which are employment stability
and realized wages.
4.2 Data and Sample
Our data are drawn from the IZA Evaluation Data Set which is an ongoing data collec-
tion process in order to provide a new data source for labor market research. The IZA
Evaluation Data Set is based on two main pillars: the ﬁrst one is a random inﬂow sample
into unemployment in Germany for the years 2001-2007 containing over 855,000 individu-
als corresponding to 4.7% of the total population of unemployment entrants. The second
pillar is a survey of roughly 18,000 individuals who were interviewed around two months
after they entered unemployment between June 2007 and May 2008 (see Caliendo et al.,
2009, for details). For our purpose we focus only on the administrative part and use an
inﬂow sample into unemployment from the years 2001 to 2003. The data is based on
the ‘Integrated Labour Market Biographies’ (ILMB, Integrierte Erwerbs-Biographien) of
6The joint distribution of the unobserved characteristics is modeled via a one factor loading approach,
i.e. the unobserved terms are loading on one common factor which allows for ﬂexible correlation between
the two terms. For a discussion of factor loading speciﬁcations in the context of multivariate proportional
hazard rate models see van den Berg (2001).
9the Public Employment Services, containing relevant register data from four sources: em-
ployment history, unemployment support recipience, participation in active labor market
programs, and job seeker history. This gives us access to detailed daily information on
employment subject to social security contribution, including occupational and sectoral
information, and the receipt and level of transfer payments during periods of unemploy-
ment, job search, and participation in diﬀerent programs of active labor market policy.
Since we observe the duration in diﬀerent states like unemployment or employment on a
daily basis, this would principally allow us estimation of continuous time duration models.
However, as in Germany most of the employment spells start at the begin of a month (and
unemployment spells last until the end of a month), we construct discrete time spell data
where one month corresponds to one time unit. Based on that we estimate discrete time
duration models later on.
Furthermore, a large variety of socio-demographic and qualiﬁcational variables is avail-
able. We can use variables such as age, marital status, number of children and nationality
(German or foreigner). A second class of variables (qualiﬁcation variables) refers to the
human capital of the individual. The attributes available are school degree and job quali-
ﬁcation. Furthermore, we can also draw on an extensive labor market history and career
variables. The available data in this regard is quite extensive (inter alia: nearly com-
plete seven-year labor market history; including daily earnings from employment; amount
of daily unemployment beneﬁts; previous profession, etc.). The employment outcomes of
these individuals are observed for 3 years after entering unemployment.
Insert Table 2 about here
Eligibility for unemployment beneﬁts is based on age and previous employment expe-
rience. We restrict our sample to men and women from West Germany who have been
employed for at least 36 months in the last seven years when entering unemployment to
ensure that extended beneﬁt duration only depends on age. We further restrict our sample
for men to be aged between 44 and 46 years which leaves us with 3,432 male unemployed
(see Table 2). For women we choose a slightly larger age range from 43.5 to 46.5 years
which results in 3,784 female unemployed. This wider age range for women ensures that we
have enough observations for both males and females in order to allow for heterogeneous
eﬀects. We also consider a second sample which consists of individuals who have been
working for 12 months in regular employment in the year prior to entering unemployment.
This ensures that all individuals in this sample are eligible for 12 and 18 months of beneﬁt
entitlement, respectively. This is related to the discussion in Section 3 on the conditions
for generating a new entitlement to unemployment beneﬁts. Doing so we loose around 30%
of the observations leaving roughly 2,200 males and 2,700 females in the sample. We refer
to this as Sample B and to the former as Sample A.
Insert Table 3 about here
We only consider two labor market states in our analysis: unemployment and em-
ployment. The unemployment state includes registered unemployment with or without
10receiving beneﬁts, participation in active labor market programs, job-seeking (if not in
regular employment at the same time) and also being out-of-the labor force. Since we do
not have any information about self-employment in the administrative data, the latter
might also include people who became self-employed. The employment state includes only
individuals who exit unemployment and who are in regular employment, i.e. those who do
not fall in one of the mentioned unemployment categories. Participants in public work pro-
grams or individuals receiving wage subsidies are not treated as regular employed. Based
on these deﬁnitions, Table 3 contains the number of transitions between the two states. For
both samples and across gender we observe approximately 25%-30% of the observations
as right-censored in unemployment. That is these individuals do not leave unemployment
within our observation period of 36 months. Conditional on having made a transition from
unemployment to employment we also see that around 40% of the men and 50% of the
women remain in this state until the end of our observation window.
4.3 Descriptives
One important identiﬁcation assumption is that the assignment to treatment around the
threshold is random. However, ﬁrms and workers may alter the timing of layoﬀs leading
to non-random selection around the threshold. If there is selection around the threshold
we would expect (i) diﬀerences in the inﬂow probability and (ii) diﬀerences in observable
characteristics for individuals below and above the age 45.
Figure 2 presents the empirical density for diﬀerent age groups in our samples. The
density is quite stable across the age range for men and women in both samples A and B,
indicating no systematic selection into the treatment. However, since we observe a slight
diﬀerence between the share of men in our sample directly below and above the age 45, we
will conduct additional estimations excluding these groups in order to test the sensitivity
of our results.
Insert Figure 2 about here
In addition, we examine the characteristics of job losers below and above the thresh-
old. Tables A.1 and A.2 contain some selected descriptives. We ﬁnd that individuals are
very similar with respect to nearly all of the variables. For men, we do observe only one
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the share of individuals with children below the age of 10 which
can be explained by the fact that individuals below the threshold are on average one year
younger. For women, we ﬁnd in addition some signiﬁcant diﬀerences in marital status, two
educational variables and the time spent in employment in the years 4-7 before entering
unemployment. These diﬀerences become largely insigniﬁcant once we use only women
in the age range from 44 to 46 years. Comparisons at other ‘artiﬁcial’ thresholds which
are unrelated to ours (e.g., at age 41) show similar patterns. This indicates that these
signiﬁcant diﬀerences may be driven by age and not by selection around the threshold.
Additionally, we will include these characteristics in our estimations.
The comparison of both the observable characteristics and the inﬂow probabilities be-
low and above the threshold do not indicate that workers delay the timing of job separation
11for the worker to beneﬁt from a longer entitlement period. The reason for this might be the
fact that the probability of beneﬁting from these additional 6 months of beneﬁt duration
is quite low at the beginning of the unemployment spell, because most of the individuals
will ﬁnd a new job within the ﬁrst 12 months of unemployment. In contrast to this, we ﬁnd
strong evidence for a selection for older workers, indicating that some workers delay the
entry into unemployment until they are 57 years old in order to combine unemployment
with early retirement (see Table 1 for the beneﬁt schemes for older workers).
Figure 3 shows the observed unemployment duration for diﬀerent groups by age of
entering unemployment. For both men and women the average unemployment duration
for those who enter unemployment after the age of 45 is higher compared to their younger
counterparts below the threshold. A linear regression of unemployment duration on the
treatment dummy and age similar to the speciﬁcation in Equation 3 shows that receiving
six more months of beneﬁts increases unemployment duration by about two months for
both men and women. In addition, for both men and women above the threshold we
observe a slight increase in unemployment duration as individuals get older.
Since our data set contains many censored observations and the impact of a longer
beneﬁt entitlement may vary over time spent in unemployment it is more informative
to look at empirical hazard rates. Figure 4 shows a spike in the probability of leaving
unemployment for a job around month 12, the last month of beneﬁt receipt for the younger
group, which is larger for women. We also observe that the spike is more pronounced for
both genders in sample B as for the control group of unemployed the potential beneﬁt
duration is exactly 12 months. However, the increase in the exit probability is rather
moderate. This might be due to the fact that transfers do not drop to zero once the
receipt of UB expires (see Section 3). Especially if the household does not have any other
sources of income, the drop is relatively small compared to other countries like the US.
Insert Figures 3, 4 and 5 about here
Figure 5 presents the empirical hazard rates for the transition from employment to
unemployment. In contrast to the hazard rates from unemployment to employment we
do not ﬁnd a clear pattern for the diﬀerences between individuals below and above the
threshold. What is striking is the spike around month 8 to 11 for men in the case of sample
A, which occurs independent of the previous duration of beneﬁt entitlement. This spike is
reduced once we condition on being continuously employed for 12 months before entering
unemployment in sample B. This indicates that the spike in the probability of reentering
unemployment is reﬂecting a seasonal pattern driven by workers who experience a short
period of unemployment every year.7
5 Results
We estimate the unemployment and employment transitions and the wage regression de-
scribed in section 4.1 for men and women separately. We present the results of two main
7This seasonal pattern can be observed for the complete inﬂow sample into unemployment and is not
speciﬁc to our age group.
12speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we include a dummy for being treated. By being
treated we mean those who enter unemployment above the age of 45 and receive extended
beneﬁt duration of 18 months. The non-treated or the controls are those who enter unem-
ployment below the age of 45 and receive beneﬁts for 12 months. For both transitions and
the wages, this speciﬁcation identiﬁes an average eﬀect of being treated on the exit rates
from unemployment and employment, respectively.
As outlined in Section 4.1, in the second speciﬁcation, for the unemployment hazard we
interact the treatment dummy with elapsed unemployment duration. For the employment
hazard and the wage regression, we interact the treatment dummy with previous unem-
ployment duration. In both cases we specify unemployment duration ﬂexibly by 3-month
intervals. With this speciﬁcation we can identify the eﬀect of treatment on the exit rate
from unemployment at diﬀerent lengths of unemployment, and the eﬀect on subsequent
job match quality.
5.1 Unemployment Hazard
Column (1) of Table 4 shows that eligibility of additional 6 months of unemployment
beneﬁts has a negative eﬀect on the hazard from unemployment. This average eﬀect is
signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level for both males and females.
In column (2) we present the results from the interaction of the treatment dummy with
unemployment duration grouped in intervals. For both males and females those eligible to
12 months of beneﬁts exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher exit rate from unemployment close to
the time beneﬁts expire. The diﬀerence between treated and controls is therefore negative.
This is consistent with the graphical evidence in Figure 4 where we observed a spike in
the unemployment hazard at 12 months for the group with 12 months of beneﬁt duration.
We ﬁnd similar patterns for both males and females for sample B as shown in columns (3)
and (4). It is worth noting that the spike is larger for sample B as it is expected, because
both groups receive exactly 12 or 18 months of beneﬁts as they have generated a new
entitlement.
Similarly to the spike at month 12 we observe another but much smaller spike around
month 18, which is the time of beneﬁt expiration for the unemployed above 45. The
coeﬃcient estimates for both men and women is positive, which indicates that the treated
group exhibits a higher exit rate compared to the control group. However, none of these
eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but illustrate a similar behavior around both
the exhaustion points of month 12 and month 18. For men, we also observe that the exit
rate in months 22-24 is signiﬁcantly lower for the treated group but this is not observed
for women.
In all speciﬁcations we control for a broad range of observable characteristics. The
coeﬃcients of model A with one treatment dummy are reported in Table A.3 in the
Appendix. The coeﬃcients show for example that for men a higher previous wage and
previous employment duration is positively correlated with the re-employment probability,
while the corresponding coeﬃcients for females are positive but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. For males and females we ﬁnd a clear negative duration dependence, which is
13signiﬁcantly reduced once we control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Insert Table 4 about here
5.2 Employment Hazard
Table 5 presents the results for the employment hazard. For both samples and genders
columns (1) and (3) show that the overall eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on the exit
rate from subsequent employment is negative but small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. We investigate whether there are heterogeneous eﬀects by interacting the treatment
dummy with previous unemployment duration. As we discussed in section 2, there are
two periods of interest. The ﬁrst is the period until month 12, where both treated and
controls receive beneﬁts while the control group gets closer to the time beneﬁts expire at
month 12. The second period is the one between month 12 to month 18 in which only the
treated group above age 45 received beneﬁts. We observe from column (2) of Table 5 that
the non-treated who ﬁnd jobs close to the time beneﬁts are exhausted and when they do
not receive beneﬁts anymore are signiﬁcantly more likely to exit subsequent employment
compared to their counterparts with extended beneﬁt duration.
Insert Table 5 about here
For men, this can be seen in column (2) by the negative eﬀect of the coeﬃcient of being
treated with previous unemployment duration of 10-12 months. Although both treated and
controls ﬁnd a job while being beneﬁt recipients, the control group obtains jobs that last
for a shorter period as they accept jobs closer to the time their beneﬁts expire. Column (4)
shows that this eﬀect is smaller for the sample B. We also observe a signiﬁcantly negative
eﬀect on the exit rate from employment for jobs found by the treated men after 16-18
months in unemployment. This suggests that jobs that are found while still receiving
beneﬁts last longer compared to jobs found after remaining in unemployment for the
same period but with exhausted beneﬁts. For women, we observe a similar eﬀect for jobs
found after 13-15 months in unemployment. Finally, for both genders and both samples
the eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on employment stability remains even after beneﬁts
have elapsed, although this eﬀect is smaller and in most cases not signiﬁcant. For example,
the interaction term of treatment with previous unemployment duration of 19-21 months
(right after beneﬁt exhaustion for the treated group) is still negative. Combining this
observation with the evidence of a small spike in the unemployment hazard at around 19-
21 for both genders suggests that the treated after receiving beneﬁts for a longer period
might not be less selective on the type of jobs they accept.
Similar to the transition process from unemployment to employment we control for a
broad range of observable characteristics (see Table A.4 in the Appendix for coeﬃcients of
model A with one treatment dummy). Once again, the previous employment experience has
an impact for men. The coeﬃcients show that previous employment duration is negatively
correlated with the probability of reentering unemployment, while previous wages do not
have an impact. In contrast to the unemployment duration, we ﬁnd a similar pattern for
14females. Moreover, the results indicate that jobs are signiﬁcantly less stable if they are
found after 24 months of unemployment.
5.3 Re-Employment Wages
We extend our analysis considering the wages received in the sample of re-employed indi-
viduals. If extended beneﬁt duration leads to better job match quality we should observe
not only longer employment duration but also higher wages. The overall eﬀect of extended
beneﬁt duration on re-employment wages is between 0-5%, but for none of the samples
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We also estimate a speciﬁcation for wages similar with
the one for the employment transition in which we interact the treatment dummy with
previous unemployment duration. Table 6 shows for both men and women and for both
samples that those who receive extended beneﬁts obtain jobs with higher wages compared
to the their counterparts with beneﬁt duration of 12 months. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant for
jobs that are found close to the beneﬁt expiration of 12 months. This suggests that as
beneﬁts are exhausted for the control group there is a reduction in the reservation wages,
which is reﬂected in re-employment wages. Jobs that are obtained when beneﬁts lapse
or when not receiving beneﬁts are not only jobs that last for a shorter period but are
associated with lower wages.
Insert Table 6 about here
The coeﬃcients of the observable characteristics for model A with one treatment
dummy are reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix. The results indicate that the re-
employment wage is positively correlated with the previous wage. Moreover, the realized
wages are decreasing the longer the workers have been unemployed. This may reﬂect a
decreasing reservation wage the longer individuals are unemployed.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We have performed additional analyses to investigate the sensitivity of our results. First,
we estimated the transitions for a sample in which we excluded the unemployment spells
that started one month before and one month after the age of 45. In Figure 2 we observed
a slight diﬀerence in the inﬂow rate in unemployment around the threshold of 45. All
ﬁndings are robust to the exclusion of these spells. If anything, the eﬀect of treatment
on the unemployment hazard increases in the restricted sample. This can also be seen in
Figure 3 where the jump in the unemployment duration around the threshold is larger
when excluding the spells very close to age 45. We also relaxed the independence assump-
tion across transitions and we estimated the model allowing for correlated unobserved
heterogeneity. The results indicate that modeling unobserved heterogeneity signiﬁcantly
improves the model ﬁt and that the processes of leaving unemployment for a job and the
subsequent employment stability are not independent from each other. However, the eﬀect
of extended beneﬁt duration does not diﬀer qualitatively between the models with and
without unobserved heterogeneity. We still ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the unemploy-
ment exit rates around month 12 for both genders in both samples. For the employment
15hazard, we also ﬁnd that jobs obtained while still receiving beneﬁts last longer compared
to jobs found after remaining in unemployment for the same period but with exhausted
beneﬁts.
We have also estimated the model considering the exit rate out of the subsequent job
instead of employment duration. The latter includes job-to-job transitions. We have also
considered a 2-years window after entering unemployment to investigate the sensitivity
of our results to the extent of right censoring. We also estimated both transitions after
considering the transitions from unemployment to out of the labor force as right-censored
spells. We ﬁnd very similar results in all cases. For the wage regressions we also estimated
a censored tobit model, which did not aﬀect the ﬁndings.
6 Conclusion
We estimate the causal eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on unemployment duration and
on the job match quality using a sharp discontinuity at age 45 on the maximum duration
of unemployment beneﬁts in Germany.
We show that there is a spike in the unemployment exit rate at the point when beneﬁts
are exhausted and that extending beneﬁt duration reduces the job-ﬁnding rate. We also
investigate the eﬀect of extended beneﬁt duration on subsequent employment stability
and re-employment wages. Our analysis shows that unemployed who obtain jobs close and
after the time when beneﬁts are exhausted are signiﬁcantly more likely to exit subsequent
employment and receive lower wages compared to their counterparts with extended beneﬁt
duration.
These ﬁndings suggest that unemployment beneﬁts do not only create disincentives but
might also improve the quality of the jobs obtained after experiencing an unemployment
spell. An important ﬁnding is that jobs that are accepted close and after beneﬁts have
expired are associated with worse post-unemployment outcomes. This suggests that the
spikes in the unemployment hazard that have been found in a number of studies might
be explained by the fact that workers become less selective as they get closer to beneﬁt
exhaustion. A role of policy might be to smooth the transition rate out of unemployment
to prevent workers from being forced to obtain low quality jobs. These eﬀects are likely to
be mitigated by the possibility to receive unemployment assistance after unemployment
insurance runs out, which is the case in Germany. Future research should shed more
light on the interaction of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance on the
unemployment exit rate and the post-unemployment outcomes. Understanding for which
sub-groups of the population the unemployment insurance job matching eﬀect matters
more is also another important question.
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Table 1: Maximum Duration of Unemploy-
ment Beneﬁt
Length of Beneﬁt Age Months worked
















Source: Social Code III (§117 et seq.)
Table 2: Number of Observations - Below
and Above the Threshold
Men Women
Below Above Below Above
Sample A 1,768 1,664 1,974 1,810
Sample B 1,147 1,094 1,442 1,334
Note: These are the number of men aged
44-44.99 (below) and 45-45.99 (above) con-
ditional on having been employed for 36
months in the last seven years. For women the
age range is 43.5-44.99 (below) and 45-46.5
(above). Sample B further restricts to individ-
uals having worked for exactly 12 months in
regular employment in the year prior to enter
unemployment.
20Table 3: Number of Transitions - Below and
Above the Threshold
Men Women
Below Above Below Above
Sample A
Observations 1,768 1,664 1,974 1,810
Transitions
From UE to E 1,318 1,198 1,512 1,321
in month 1-3 623 534 531 466
4-6 181 196 223 184
7-12 201 174 312 228
13-18 133 119 191 172
19-24 76 67 111 120
24-36 104 108 144 151
Censored 450 466 462 489
From E to UE 804 742 716 620
Censored 514 456 796 701
Sample B
Observations 1,147 1,094 1,442 1,334
Transitions
From UE to E 857 780 1,110 977
in month 1-3 392 329 374 328
4-6 108 114 145 122
7-12 145 122 246 166
13-18 90 89 152 143
19-24 52 48 81 100
24-36 70 78 112 118
Censored 290 314 332 357
From E to UE 463 431 474 411
Censored 394 349 636 566
Note: These are the number of transitions from un-
employment (UE) to employment (E) and vice versa
for the two samples.
21Table 4: Unemployment Hazard Estimates by Gender
Men
Sample A Sample B
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated −0.149∗ 0.086 −0.184∗ 0.104
Treated * t(1-3) −0.192∗ 0.100 −0.244∗∗ 0.122
Treated * t(4-6) 0.032 0.130 −0.022 0.164
Treated * t(7-9) 0.052 0.160 0.044 0.196
Treated * t(10-12) −0.510∗∗∗ 0.179 −0.614∗∗∗ 0.209
Treated * t(13-15) −0.313∗ 0.189 −0.190 0.223
Treated * t(16-18) −0.079 0.206 −0.122 0.248
Treated * t(19-21) 0.195 0.255 0.191 0.309
Treated * t(22-24) −0.640∗∗ 0.258 −0.633∗∗ 0.305
Treated * t(25-28) −0.059 0.199 0.093 0.240
Treated * t(29-36) −0.070 0.222 −0.191 0.268
Women
Sample A Sample B
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated −0.149∗ 0.080 −0.158∗ 0.093
Treated * t(1-3) −0.090 0.097 −0.096 0.115
Treated * t(4-6) −0.168 0.123 −0.150 0.150
Treated * t(7-9) 0.024 0.142 −0.098 0.165
Treated * t(10-12) −0.674∗∗∗ 0.148 −0.734∗∗∗ 0.170
Treated * t(13-15) −0.379∗∗ 0.168 −0.318∗ 0.186
Treated * t(16-18) −0.013 0.168 −0.033 0.190
Treated * t(19-21) −0.183 0.193 −0.070 0.219
Treated * t(22-24) 0.176 0.215 0.291 0.247
Treated * t(25-28) −0.118 0.172 −0.158 0.194
Treated * t(29-36) 0.044 0.193 0.076 0.223
Note: ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. Full estimation results are available in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
22Table 5: Employment Hazard Estimates by Gender
Men
Sample A Sample B
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated −0.067 0.107 −0.048 0.139
Treated * (PUD 1-3) 0.029 0.118 0.112 0.157
Treated * (PUD 4-6) 0.044 0.160 0.110 0.222
Treated * (PUD 7-9) −0.206 0.203 −0.077 0.252
Treated * (PUD 10-12) −0.433∗ 0.258 −0.338 0.294
Treated * (PUD 13-15) 0.047 0.254 −0.035 0.313
Treated * (PUD 16-18) −0.449 0.286 −0.737∗∗ 0.345
Treated * (PUD 19-21) −0.264 0.385 −0.592 0.473
Treated * (PUD 22-24) −0.038 0.389 −0.065 0.443
Treated * (PUD 25-28) −0.436 0.329 −0.398 0.373
Treated * (PUD 29-36) −0.220 0.526 −0.321 0.611
Previous Unemployment Duration (in months)
(PUD 4-6) 0.103 0.075 0.088 0.114 0.073 0.106 0.061 0.161
(PUD 7-9) 0.165∗ 0.100 0.284∗∗ 0.143 0.281∗∗ 0.124 0.371∗∗ 0.183
(PUD 10-12) −0.123 0.121 0.059 0.151 −0.009 0.141 0.171 0.182
(PUD 13-15) −0.164 0.125 −0.172 0.171 −0.003 0.155 0.063 0.219
(PUD 16-18) 0.044 0.143 0.272 0.190 0.088 0.176 0.490∗∗ 0.217
(PUD 19-21) 0.102 0.181 0.263 0.324 0.191 0.229 0.584 0.380
(PUD 22-24) 0.172 0.189 0.206 0.242 0.527∗∗ 0.211 0.606∗∗ 0.266
PUD 25-28) 0.390∗∗ 0.164 0.616∗∗∗ 0.227 0.679∗∗∗ 0.187 0.952∗∗∗ 0.272
(PUD 28-36) 0.741∗∗∗ 0.264 0.879∗∗ 0.399 1.045∗∗∗ 0.304 1.278∗∗∗ 0.477
Women
Sample A Sample B
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated −0.047 0.114 −0.136 0.140
Treated * (PUD 1-3) 0.056 0.135 −0.014 0.173
Treated * (PUD 4-6) −0.139 0.170 −0.118 0.214
Treated * (PUD 7-9) 0.180 0.203 0.028 0.243
Treated * (PUD 10-12) −0.066 0.217 −0.133 0.254
Treated * (PUD 13-15) −0.460∗ 0.236 −0.634∗∗ 0.274
Treated * (PUD 16-18) −0.047 0.274 −0.210 0.311
Treated * (PUD 19-21) −0.335 0.278 −0.258 0.317
Treated * (PUD 22-24) 0.240 0.372 0.240 0.408
Treated * (PUD 25-28) −0.349 0.302 −0.514 0.345
Treated * (PUD 29-36) 0.288 0.492 0.035 0.560
Previous Unemployment Duration (in months)
PUD (4-6) 0.272∗∗∗ 0.082 0.362∗∗∗ 0.112 0.318∗∗∗ 0.106 0.367∗∗ 0.148
PUD (7-9) 0.188∗ 0.099 0.120 0.149 0.341∗∗∗ 0.122 0.320∗ 0.178
PUD (10-12) 0.038 0.104 0.093 0.129 0.295∗∗ 0.124 0.350∗∗ 0.153
PUD (13-15) 0.151 0.117 0.372∗∗ 0.154 0.238∗ 0.137 0.514∗∗∗ 0.182
PUD (16-18) −0.012 0.137 0.036 0.203 0.272∗ 0.158 0.369 0.227
PUD (19-21) 0.431∗∗∗ 0.139 0.617∗∗∗ 0.184 0.533∗∗∗ 0.162 0.654∗∗∗ 0.221
PUD (22-24) 0.159 0.182 0.046 0.280 0.508∗∗ 0.199 0.341 0.318
PUD (25-28) 0.318∗∗ 0.152 0.507∗∗ 0.193 0.487∗∗∗ 0.174 0.714∗∗∗ 0.221
PUD (29-36) 0.535∗∗ 0.245 0.396 0.372 0.712∗∗ 0.280 0.671 0.418
Note: ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. Full estimation results are available in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
23Table 6: Re-Employment Wage (in logs) Estimates by Gender
Men
Sample A Sample B
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated 0.025 0.024 0.049 0.030
Treated * (PUD 1-3) −0.001 0.026 0.001 0.033
Treated * (PUD 4-6) 0.044 0.037 0.071 0.045
Treated * (PUD 7-9) 0.096∗ 0.050 0.115∗∗ 0.054
Treated * (PUD 10-12) 0.095∗ 0.054 0.148∗∗ 0.067
Treated * (PUD 13-15) 0.074 0.060 0.169∗∗ 0.076
Treated * (PUD 16-18) −0.069 0.076 −0.079 0.096
Treated * (PUD 19-21) 0.061 0.091 0.167 0.126
Treated * (PUD 22-24) −0.036 0.103 −0.092 0.131
Treated * (PUD 25-28) 0.063 0.075 0.087 0.089
Treated * (PUD 29-36) 0.015 0.120 0.154 0.167
Previous Unemployment Duration (in months)
(PUD 4-6) −0.070∗∗∗ 0.017 −0.091∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.055∗∗∗ 0.021 −0.089∗∗∗ 0.026
(PUD 7-9) −0.065∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.116∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.057∗∗ 0.026 −0.117∗∗∗ 0.039
(PUD 10-12) −0.109∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.150∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.148∗∗∗ 0.035 −0.208∗∗∗ 0.049
(PUD 13-15) −0.120∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.154∗∗∗ 0.041 −0.121∗∗∗ 0.037 −0.200∗∗∗ 0.058
(PUD 16-18) −0.140∗∗∗ 0.037 −0.103∗∗ 0.050 −0.219∗∗∗ 0.048 −0.175∗∗∗ 0.065
(PUD 19-21) −0.170∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.204∗∗∗ 0.062 −0.251∗∗∗ 0.060 −0.344∗∗∗ 0.103
(PUD 22-24) −0.088∗∗ 0.045 −0.078∗ 0.047 −0.153∗∗ 0.058 −0.120∗∗ 0.059
PUD 25-28) −0.225∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.258∗∗∗ 0.059 −0.308∗∗∗ 0.043 −0.353∗∗∗ 0.075
(PUD 28-36) −0.292∗∗∗ 0.059 −0.299∗∗∗ 0.094 −0.271∗∗∗ 0.078 −0.358∗∗ 0.141
Women
Sample A Sample B
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated −0.008 0.042 0.032 0.049
Treated * (PUD 1-3) −0.053 0.044 −0.006 0.053
Treated * (PUD 4-6) −0.031 0.061 −0.035 0.073
Treated * (PUD 7-9) 0.063 0.071 0.067 0.085
Treated * (PUD 10-12) 0.150∗ 0.085 0.262∗∗ 0.093
Treated * (PUD 13-15) 0.074 0.098 0.168 0.109
Treated * (PUD 16-18) −0.091 0.109 −0.032 0.126
Treated * (PUD 19-21) −0.001 0.128 0.061 0.144
Treated * (PUD 22-24) −0.077 0.161 −0.184 0.182
Treated * (PUD 25-28) −0.072 0.114 −0.070 0.133
Treated * (PUD 29-36) 0.071 0.141 0.029 0.161
Previous Unemployment Duration (in months)
PUD (4-6) −0.115∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.125∗∗∗ 0.034 −0.079∗∗ 0.033 −0.066 0.042
PUD (7-9) −0.137∗∗∗ 0.033 −0.195∗∗∗ 0.048 −0.142∗∗∗ 0.039 −0.177∗∗∗ 0.056
PUD (10-12) −0.410∗∗∗ 0.041 −0.488∗∗∗ 0.054 −0.401∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.502∗∗∗ 0.062
PUD (13-15) −0.241∗∗∗ 0.047 −0.298∗∗∗ 0.071 −0.270∗∗∗ 0.052 −0.351∗∗∗ 0.080
PUD (16-18) −0.538∗∗∗ 0.053 −0.514∗∗∗ 0.078 −0.574∗∗∗ 0.061 −0.557∗∗∗ 0.089
PUD (19-21) −0.463∗∗∗ 0.063 −0.486∗∗∗ 0.086 −0.505∗∗∗ 0.071 −0.536∗∗∗ 0.102
PUD (22-24) −0.569∗∗∗ 0.077 −0.550∗∗∗ 0.120 −0.530∗∗∗ 0.088 −0.416∗∗∗ 0.136
PUD (25-28) −0.565∗∗∗ 0.055 −0.554∗∗∗ 0.076 −0.566∗∗∗ 0.064 −0.533∗∗∗ 0.091
PUD (29-36) −0.529∗∗∗ 0.070 −0.591∗∗∗ 0.095 −0.571∗∗∗ 0.080 −0.586∗∗∗ 0.101
Note: ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. Full estimation results are available in Table A.5 in the Appendix.
24Figures
Figure 1: Stylized Expected Treatment Eﬀect
Note: In our empirical analysis T1 = 12, while T2 = 18.
25Figure 2: Density of the Forcing Variable (Inﬂows by Age)
Men - Sample A Men - Sample B
Women - Sample A Women - Sample B
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
26Figure 3: Duration of First Unemployment Spell
Men - Sample A Men - Sample B
Women - Sample A Women - Sample B
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
27Figure 4: Empirical Unemployment Hazard Function by Treatment
Men - Sample A Men - Sample B
Women - Sample A Women - Sample B
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
28Figure 5: Empirical Employment Hazard Function by Treatment
Men - Sample A Men - Sample B
Women - Sample A Women - Sample B
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
29A Supplementary Tables
Table A.1: Selected Descriptives and t-Test of Mean Equality for the Two Samples -
Men
Age Group Sample A Sample B
Below Above p-value Below Above p-value
N 1768 1664 1147 1094
Age (in years) 44.49 45.50 0.00 44.49 45.50 0.00
Marital status
Married 0.63 0.64 0.52 0.63 0.64 0.70
Nationality
Non-German 0.10 0.10 0.77 0.09 0.09 0.71
Migration background 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.72
Children ≤ 10 years 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.18 0.15 0.12
School Degree
No degree 0.08 0.09 0.39 0.08 0.09 0.47
Low 0.60 0.60 0.97 0.56 0.54 0.53
Medium 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.13
High 0.16 0.17 0.43 0.18 0.21 0.09
Apprenticeship (yes) 0.81 0.79 0.25 0.79 0.78 0.43
University Degree (yes) 0.11 0.13 0.26 0.14 0.16 0.16
Occupational Group
Agriculture, Other 0.04 0.03 0.75 0.02 0.02 0.76
Manufacturing 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.91
Technical Occupations 0.06 0.06 0.97 0.08 0.08 0.80
Services 0.42 0.41 0.58 0.44 0.44 0.91
Labor Market History
Last daily income (in Euro) 75.92 75.94 0.99 81.44 82.00 0.72
Employment last 3 years (in months) 30.66 30.64 0.95 33.82 33.80 0.91
Employment last 4-7 years (in months) 39.00 39.33 0.40 39.41 39.44 0.95
Unemployed last 7 years (in months) 5.38 5.39 0.94 3.21 3.16 0.80
Months in employment - Year t-1 10.50 10.44 0.55 12.00 12.00
t-2 10.02 10.11 0.45 11.11 11.19 0.45
t-3 10.16 10.11 0.64 10.71 10.62 0.45
Year cohort
2001 0.27 0.27 0.96 0.26 0.26 0.84
2002 0.35 0.34 0.45 0.37 0.36 0.70
2003 0.38 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.38 0.57
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
Note: p-value for t-test of mean equality between above/below age groups.
30Table A.2: Selected Descriptives and t-Test of Mean Equality for the Two Samples -
Women
Age Group Sample A Sample B
Below Above p-value Below Above p-value
N 1974 1810 1442 1334
Age (in years) 44.24 45.75 0.00 44.24 45.74 0.00
Marital status
Married 0.62 0.64 0.13 0.62 0.65 0.07
Nationality
Non-German 0.06 0.06 0.73 0.06 0.05 0.33
Migration background 0.02 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.02 0.35
Children ≤ 10 years 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.01
School Degree
No degree 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.45
Low 0.50 0.53 0.07 0.47 0.52 0.01
Medium 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.26
High 0.17 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.15 0.01
Apprenticeship (yes) 0.80 0.79 0.39 0.81 0.81 0.58
University Degree (yes) 0.10 0.10 0.63 0.12 0.09 0.06
Occupational Group
Agriculture, Other 0.02 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.69
Manufacturing 0.17 0.16 0.51 0.15 0.15 0.50
Technical Occupations 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.02 0.02 0.41
Services 0.79 0.80 0.69 0.82 0.82 0.83
Labor Market History
Last daily income (in Euro) 49.96 50.53 0.59 53.22 52.63 0.63
Employment last 3 years (in months) 31.39 31.26 0.59 33.84 33.91 0.67
Employment last 4-7 years (in months) 36.37 37.28 0.04 36.15 37.31 0.03
Unemployed last 7 years (in months) 4.21 4.15 0.74 2.87 2.64 0.20
Months in employment - Year t-1 10.80 10.76 0.57 12.00 12.00
t-minus2 10.38 10.27 0.31 11.22 11.24 0.76
t-minus3 10.21 10.23 0.85 10.63 10.68 0.66
Year cohort
2001 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.14
2002 0.33 0.33 0.93 0.34 0.33 0.55
2003 0.39 0.37 0.27 0.40 0.39 0.45
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations. Note: p-value for t-test of mean equality between
above/below age groups.
31Table A.3: Unemployment Hazard Estimates by Gender
Men Women
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated −0.149∗ 0.086 −0.149∗ 0.080
Age (untreated) 0.185∗ 0.107 −0.074 0.066
Age (treated) −0.035 0.103 0.098 0.064
School Degree (Ref.: No Degree)
Low 0.102 0.081 0.066 0.090
Medium −0.107 0.097 0.035 0.096
High −0.106 0.105 −0.084 0.109
Apprenticeship 0.223∗∗∗ 0.068 0.211∗∗∗ 0.058
University Degree 0.003 0.095 −0.051 0.092
Occupational Group (Ref.: Agriculture, Other)
Manufacturing −0.111 0.129 0.463∗∗ 0.186
Technical Occupations −0.348∗∗ 0.157 0.216 0.230
Services −0.358∗∗∗ 0.132 0.459∗∗ 0.180
Marital Status
Married 0.227∗∗∗ 0.046 0.040 0.042
Children ≤ 10 years −0.066 0.062 −0.206∗∗ 0.087
Nationality
Non-German −0.209∗∗∗ 0.079 −0.140 0.090
Migration background 0.245∗∗ 0.109 0.407∗∗∗ 0.126
Labor Market History
Last daily income (in Euro) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗ 0.001
Employment last 3 years (in months) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 0.003
Employment last 4-7 years (in months) 0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.000 0.001
Entry into Unemployment (Ref.: 2001)
2002 −0.111∗ 0.057 −0.140∗∗∗ 0.051
2003 0.044 0.054 −0.169∗∗∗ 0.049
Duration Dependence (Ref.: t(1-3), in months)
t(4-6) −0.867∗∗∗ 0.063 −0.715∗∗∗ 0.062
t(7-9) −1.289∗∗∗ 0.078 −0.993∗∗∗ 0.071
t(10-12) −1.457∗∗∗ 0.086 −0.856∗∗∗ 0.071
t(13-15) −1.501∗∗∗ 0.092 −1.121∗∗∗ 0.083
t(16-18) −1.609∗∗∗ 0.101 −1.022∗∗∗ 0.084
t(19-21) −2.023∗∗∗ 0.125 −1.252∗∗∗ 0.096
t(22-24) −1.911∗∗∗ 0.124 −1.401∗∗∗ 0.106
t(25-28) −2.033∗∗∗ 0.098 −1.483∗∗∗ 0.085
t(29-36) −2.173∗∗∗ 0.110 −1.623∗∗∗ 0.096
Constant −2.703∗∗∗ 0.194 −2.714∗∗∗ 0.234
Note: ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. This refers to column (1) in Table 4
(Sample A with treatment dummy).
32Table A.4: Employment Hazard Estimates by Gender
Men Women
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated −0.067 0.107 −0.047 0.114
Age (untreated) 0.222∗ 0.124 0.102 0.094
Age (treated) −0.071 0.128 −0.064 0.092
School Degree (Ref.: No Degree)
Low 0.037 0.098 0.180 0.128
Medium −0.218∗ 0.123 0.103 0.138
High −0.110 0.142 0.054 0.154
Apprenticeship 0.131 0.087 −0.150∗ 0.083
University Degree −0.318∗∗ 0.138 −0.094 0.124
Occupational Group (Ref.: Agriculture, Other)
Manufacturing −0.069 0.130 −0.187 0.199
Technical Occupations −0.308∗ 0.180 −0.507 0.310
Services −0.309∗∗ 0.135 −0.318∗ 0.191
Marital Status
Married −0.135∗∗ 0.058 −0.220∗∗∗ 0.058
Children ≤ 10 years 0.042 0.077 −0.303∗∗ 0.130
Nationality
Non-German 0.253∗∗∗ 0.093 0.066 0.127
Migration background 0.029 0.128 0.008 0.179
Labor Market History
Last daily income (in Euro) −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001
Employment last 3 years (in months) −0.029∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.024∗∗∗ 0.004
Employment last 4-7 years (in months) −0.013∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.007∗∗∗ 0.002
Entry into Unemployment (Ref.: 2001)
2002 0.057 0.069 0.190∗∗ 0.073
2003 0.203∗∗∗ 0.066 0.263∗∗∗ 0.071
Previous Unemployment Duration (in months)
PUD (4-6) 0.103 0.075 0.272∗∗∗ 0.082
PUD (7-9) 0.165∗ 0.100 0.188∗ 0.099
PUD (10-12) −0.123 0.121 0.038 0.104
PUD (13-15) −0.164 0.125 0.151 0.117
PUD (16-18) 0.044 0.143 −0.012 0.137
PUD (19-21) 0.102 0.181 0.431∗∗∗ 0.139
PUD (22-24) 0.172 0.189 0.159 0.182
PUD (25-28) 0.390∗∗ 0.164 0.318∗∗ 0.152
PUD (29-36) 0.741∗∗∗ 0.264 0.535∗∗ 0.245
Duration Dependence (Ref.: t(1-3), in months)
t(4-6) −0.032 0.086 −0.201∗∗ 0.084
t(7-9) 0.384∗∗∗ 0.082 −0.300∗∗∗ 0.091
t(10-12) 0.320∗∗∗ 0.093 −0.427∗∗∗ 0.100
t(13-15) −0.740∗∗∗ 0.135 −1.050∗∗∗ 0.131
t(16-18) −0.376∗∗∗ 0.123 −0.942∗∗∗ 0.131
t(19-21) −0.258∗∗ 0.125 −1.014∗∗∗ 0.142
t(22-24) −0.354∗∗ 0.140 −0.845∗∗∗ 0.140
t(25-28) −0.980∗∗∗ 0.149 −1.223∗∗∗ 0.139
t(29-36) −0.589∗∗∗ 0.171 −1.397∗∗∗ 0.210
Constant −1.655∗∗∗ 0.229 −1.860∗∗∗ 0.271
Note: ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. This refers to column (1) in Table 5
(Sample A with treatment dummy).
33Table A.5: Re-Employment Wage (in logs) Estimates by Gender
Men Women
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE
Treated 0.025 0.024 −0.008 0.042
Age (untreated) 0.014 0.029 0.035 0.035
Age (treated) −0.016 0.027 −0.001 0.033
School Degree (Ref.: No Degree)
Low −0.011 0.023 0.005 0.044
Medium 0.015 0.029 0.151∗∗∗ 0.048
High 0.036 0.035 0.187∗∗∗ 0.057
Apprenticeship 0.090∗∗∗ 0.021 0.101∗∗∗ 0.031
University Degree 0.117∗∗∗ 0.036 0.165∗∗∗ 0.047
Occupational Group (Ref.: Agriculture, Other)
Manufacturing 0.000 0.033 0.102 0.083
Technical Occupations 0.111∗∗ 0.045 0.389∗∗∗ 0.118
Services −0.031 0.034 0.102 0.080
Marital Status
Married 0.066∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.127∗∗∗ 0.021
Children ≤ 10 years 0.031∗ 0.016 −0.185∗∗∗ 0.058
Nationality
Non-German −0.049∗∗ 0.025 0.096∗∗ 0.043
Migration background −0.010 0.028 0.017 0.069
Labor Market History
Last daily income (in Euro) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
Employment last 3 years (in months) 0.002∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Employment last 4-7 years (in months) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001
Entry into Unemployment (Ref.: 2001)
2002 −0.025 0.015 −0.042 0.026
2003 −0.033∗∗ 0.015 −0.087∗∗∗ 0.025
Previous Unemployment Duration (in months)
PUD (4-6) −0.070∗∗∗ 0.017 −0.115∗∗∗ 0.027
PUD (7-9) −0.065∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.137∗∗∗ 0.033
PUD (10-12) −0.109∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.410∗∗∗ 0.041
PUD (13-15) −0.120∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.241∗∗∗ 0.047
PUD (16-18) −0.140∗∗∗ 0.037 −0.538∗∗∗ 0.053
PUD (19-21) −0.170∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.463∗∗∗ 0.063
PUD (22-24) −0.088∗∗ 0.045 −0.569∗∗∗ 0.077
PUD (25-28) −0.225∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.565∗∗∗ 0.055
PUD (29-36) −0.292∗∗∗ 0.059 −0.529∗∗∗ 0.070
Constant 3.664∗∗∗ 0.055 3.365∗∗∗ 0.105
Note: ***/**/* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. This refers to column (1) in Table 6
(Sample A with treatment dummy).
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